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Abstract—Deep neural network (DNN) as a popular machine
learning model is found to be vulnerable to adversarial attack.
This attack constructs adversarial examples by adding small
perturbations to the raw input, while appearing unmodified to
human eyes but will be misclassified by a well-trained classifier.
In this paper, we focus on the black-box attack setting where
attackers have almost no access to the underlying models. To
conduct black-box attack, a popular approach aims to train
a substitute model based on the information queried from
the target DNN. The substitute model can then be attacked
using existing white-box attack approaches, and the generated
adversarial examples will be used to attack the target DNN.
Despite its encouraging results, this approach suffers from poor
query efficiency, i.e., attackers usually needs to query a huge
amount of times to collect enough information for training an
accurate substitute model. To this end, we first utilize state-of-the-
art white-box attack methods to generate samples for querying,
and then introduce an active learning strategy to significantly
reduce the number of queries needed. Besides, we also propose
a diversity criterion to avoid the sampling bias. Our extensive
experimental results on MNIST and CIFAR-10 show that the
proposed method can reduce more than 90% of queries while
preserve attacking success rates and obtain an accurate substitute
model which is more than 85% similar with the target oracle.
Keywords-Deep Neural Network, Active Learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved great suc-
cesses in a variety of domains [1]. However, recent studies
have shown that DNNs may be easily fooled by adversarial
examples [2]. For example, in the context of image classi-
fication, an adversarial example is an image that is visually
indistinguishable to the original image but can mislead the
DNN model to output incorrect labels. In addition to im-
age classification, attacks to other DNN-related tasks have
also been actively investigated, such as semantic segmen-
tation [3], machine translation [4], visual QA [5], image
captioning [6], speech recognition [7], medical prediction [8],
and autonomous driving [9].
Depending on how much information the attackers have
access to, adversarial attack can be broadly classified into two
categories: white-box attack and black-box attack. The adver-
sary in the white-box setting has full access to the target DNN
model [2], [10], [11]. In the black-box setting, adversaries
can only access the input and output of the underlying DNN
Fig. 1: Adversarial example generated by our substitute model
with FGSM (λ = 0.03) on CIFAR-10. The first two lines are
the original images and the last two lines which are surrounded
by red lines are adversarial examples which will mislead the
oracle.
but not its internal configurations and parameters [12], [13].
Recent studies have shown that both of these two categories
of attacks can reach a extremely high success rate of attack.
Although a lot of defense methods [14]–[16] were designed to
increase the robustness of the model, the white-box attack [17]
can still conquer the model with nearly 100% success rate by
estimating the gradient through approximation or expectation
[18].
Compared to the white-box setting, the black-box setting is
much more practical since a majority of real-world learning
systems do not allow white-box access due to security reasons.
Most of existing black-box attack methods are based on
the transferability phenomenon [13], where an adversary first
trains a substitute model and then crafts adversarial examples
against it, hoping that the generated adversarial examples
can also successfully attack the underlying black-box models.
Black-box attack can also bypass most defense methods that
change the model structure to increase robustness for the
reason that it is isolated from the target model. The black-
box variants of JSMA [19] and of the Carlini & Wagner
attack [10] both obtain over 95% success rate on adversarial
examples. However, a key limitation of these approaches is that
training a substitute network requires a large number of queries
to collect sufficient information. For example, the number of
queries in [13] increases almost exponentially with respect to
the number of iterations.
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In this paper, we address this issue by employing the
active learning strategy. Specifically, we first utilize the state-
of-the-art white-box attack methods to generate adversarial
examples. We then improve the query-efficiency of transfer-
based framework by actively selecting the most informative
samples. Furthermore, we propose a diversity criterion to avoid
the bias caused by active learning. We summarize our main
contributions as follows:
• We propose to use more advanced methods for data
augmentation in transfer-based framework, and verify that
C&W attack method [10] and Deepfool [11] are more
effective than the raw Jacobian-based method [13].
• We propose to use active learning strategy to select the
most informative samples for querying. To avoid the bias
caused by active learning, we further introduce a diversity
criterion to ensure that the sampled queries are both
informative and diverse.
• We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate our
method. Our empirical results show that the proposed
approach can significantly reduce the number of queries
while preserve the success rate of attack.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly review the existing work of
adversarial attacks and active learning.
A. Adversarial Attack Methods
White-box attack: In the following, we summarize four
principal white-box attack methods as follows.
• Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [2]: FGSM aims to
construct the adversarial examples such that the `∞-norm
of the perturbation is constrained by a small constant. The
perturbation can be formulated as
δ = λ · sign(∇xf(x)),
where λ is the magnitude of the perturbation and f(·)
is the prediction of a neural network. This perturbation
can be calculated within one back-propagation of the
network. This method affirms that the linear part of the
neural network has a serious impact on the composition
of the adversarial examples. At the same time, there are
no efficient ways to defend against such attacks in neural
networks, such as dropout as well as pre-training and
adding infinite norm regularizations, other than adding
the adversarial examples into the training set.
• Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [20]:
JSMA first computes Jacobian matrix of given sample
x as ∇xf(x), it then identifies features of x that made
most significant changes to the output. A small pertur-
bation was designed to successfully induce large output
variations so that changes in a small portion of features
could fool the neural network. For an input x and a neural
network F (·), the output for class j is denoted Fj(x).
This attack is constructed by exploiting the adversarial
saliency map, which is defined as
S(x, t)[i] =
{
0, if∂Ft(x)∂xi < 0 or
∑
j 6=t
∂Fj(x)
∂xi
> 0,
(∂Ft(x)∂xi )|
∑
j 6=t
∂Fj(x)
∂xi
|, otherwise,
where t is the target class and the procedure of the attack
is to iteratively locate the pair of features {i, j} that
maximizes S(X, t)[i]+S(X, t)[j], and repeatedly perturb
the original example by a constant offset.
• DeepFool [11]: Deepfool assumes that the neural net-
works are totally linear and there exists a hyperplane
which can separate each class from another. The authors
derive the optimal solution to this simplified problem and
they use a `2 minimization-based formulation to search
for adversarial examples. The purpose of Deepfool is to
solve the following optimization problem:
min ‖δ‖2, s. t. f(x+ δ) 6= f(x)
DeepFool uses geometry information for directing the
search for the minimal perturbation to fool a network.
• C&W attack [10]: C&W attack is by far one of the
strongest attacks: it can achieve almost 100% attack suc-
cess rate and has bypassed 10 different methods designed
for detecting adversarial examples [21]. It formulates the
task of generating adversarial examples as an optimiza-
tion problem:
min ‖δ‖p + c · g(x+ δ)
s. t. x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n,
where g(·) represents an objective function which is de-
signed to simplify the non-linear constraint in the original
problem. C&W designed a special objective function
based on the hinge loss:
f(x) = max{max
i 6=t
[Z(x)]i − [Z(x)]t,−k}.
C&W attack also has some variations. For example, EAD
attack [22] proposes to use elastic-net regularization, a
linear combination of `1-norm and `2-norm, to replace the
`p-norm introduced in C&W attack for penalizing large
distortion between the original and adversarial examples.
Black-box attack: Black-box attack can be roughly divided
into the following categories:
• Score-based attack: Score-based attack methods rely on
the predicted scores (e.g. class probabilities or logits) to
estimate the underlying gradients. Typical methods in this
category include black-box variants of JSMA [19] and of
the C&W attack [12], [23], as well as generator networks
that predict adversarial [24].
• Decision-based attack: Decision-based attack was pro-
posed by [25]. It starts from a large adversarial per-
turbation and then iteratively reduces the perturbation
while ensuring that the adversarial example stays in the
adversarial region.
• Transfer-based attack: Transfer-based attack aims to
train a substitute network using the information queried
from the underlying target model [13]. This method uses
inputs synthetically crafted by the local substitute model
and labeled by the target oracle. It has been shown that
when the substitute model was well-trained, its adversar-
ial examples can also mislead the target model. The pre-
vious work of transfer-based attack [13] used Jacobian-
based data augmentation, so the number of query doubles
with the increase of iterations. Although it used reservoir
sampling method which is one of the random select
methods to reduce the queries, the exponential growth
in the first few iterations has led to a significant increase
in the number of queries.
B. Active Learning
Active learning is a widely used framework in which
the learner is able to select the most informative unlabeled
examples for human annotation [26]. The learning algorithm
actively engages an oracle to request information in addition to
the original training set. The learner employs a query strategy
to select instances for labeling. The main purpose of active
learning is to reduce the total cost of labeling. It can be
roughly divided into three scenarios: query synthesis, selective
sampling and pool-based active learning [27]–[29]. Pool-based
active learning is a practical scenario, where learners can
choose from the pool of unlabeled data for labeling. There
are three typical pool-based strategies as follows:
• Random Select (RS) Method: RS method can be viewed
as a passive selection method, where unlabeled data are
selected randomly at each iteration without any active
query criterion. The RS method is often served as the
baseline to be compared with other active selection meth-
ods.
• Least Confidence (LC) Method [30]: LC criterion
selects the samples which are the least confident based
on the posterior probabilities for all the classes.
The well-known Max Entropy [27], [31] is a popular
uncertainty measurement widely used in previous studies
of active learning: H(x) = −∑y∈Y P (y|x) logP (y|x),
where P (y|x) is a posteriori probability of y given x. We
denote the output class asy ∈ Y = {y1, y2, ..., yk}. H(·)
is the uncertainty measurement function based on the
entropy estimation of the classifiers posterior distribution.
The higher H(x) is, the harder the example x seems to
the classifier.
• Margin based methods: Margin based learning algo-
rithm [28], [32] is an active learning algorithm which
selects a hypothesis by minimizing a loss function using
the margin of instance. For multi-class classification [29],
a widely accepted definition for multi-class margin is
pmulticlass(x, y, f) = fy(x)− fy˙(x), where y represents
the true label and y˙ = argmaxy′∈Y fy′(x) corresponds
to the highest activation value such that y˙ 6= y. So the
samples we select can be formulated as
x∗ = argmin
x
[fyˆ(x)− fy˜(x)],
where yˆ = argmaxy′∈Y fy′(x) represents the predicted
label and y˜ = argmaxy′∈Y\yˆ fy′(x) represents the label
corresponding to the second highest activation value.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first present a passive learning framework
which replaces the Jacobian-based method with other white-
box attack approaches. Then, we introduce active learning into
this framework to reduce the number of queries.
A. A Passive Learning Framework
The transfer-based framework [13] firstly collects a very
small set S0 of inputs which are representatives of the input
domain. Then it designs a network architecture F , which will
be trained as the substitute model. The adversary applies a
data augmentation technique on the current training set Sρ to
produce a larger training set Sρ+1 with more synthetic training
points. The purpose of data augmentation is to learn about
the decision boundary which is hidden in the deep neural
networks. Our passive learning framework is summarized in
Algorithm 1. The key operation is Step 5, in which we use
certain method to craft samples for query.
Algorithm 1 Substitute DNN Training
INPUT: target oracle O˜, a maximum number ρmax of training
epochs, and an initial training set S0.
OUTPUT: a trained substitute model F .
1: Define architecture F ;
2: for ρ = 0; ρ < ρmax; ρ++ do
3: D ← D ∪ {(x, O˜(x))|x ∈ Sadd};
4: train F with D;
5: craft Sadd;
6: Sρ+1 ← Sρ ∪ Sadd;
7: end for
We denote O˜(x) as the output of the target oracle O˜ queried
with instance x. The original method for crafting samples is
the Jacobian-based method which constructs a sample along
the direction of the gradient of the current substitute model and
gradually learns the shape of the oracle’s decision boundary.
However, samples crafted by recent white-box attack methods
contain more information about the decision boundary than
those crafted by Jacobian-based augmentation. Instead of sim-
ply taking a fixed step along the direction of the gradient, these
methods can adopt adaptive steps to make the constructed
samples cross the decision boundary or directly solve an
optimization problem to generate samples. So we use more
advanced white-box attack methods to implement Step 5 of
Algorithm 1, stated below.
• FGSM [2]: Sadd = {x + λ · sign(∇xF (x))|x ∈ Sρ},
where λ is the hyper-parameter.
• Iterative Gradient Sign (IGS) [33]:
Sadd = {x+ clip(α · sign(∇xF (x)))},
where clip(·) performs a per-dimension clipping to
constrain the result in the `∞ -neighbourhood of the
input x.
• Fast Gradient Value (FGV) [34]:
Sadd = {x+ λ · ∇xF (x)|x ∈ Sρ}
• JSMA [20]: Here we construct adversarial examples by
modifying a limited number of pixels of the input image
within the constrain of `2-norm.
• Deepfool [11]:
Sadd =
{
x+
|Fl| × |∇xFl(x)|
‖∇xFl(x)‖22
×sign(∇xFl(x))|x ∈ Sρ
}
,
where Fl is the l-th dimension of F (·).
• C&W [10]: For each instance x in Sρ, we solve an
optimization problem:
min ‖δ‖2 + c · g(x+ δ)
s. t. x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n,
where g(x) = max(maxi6=l(Z(x)i) − Z(x)t,−κ), Z(·)
presents the softmax function and κ is a constant to
control the confidence. In our framework, we choose
`2-norm to constrain the size of the perturbation. The
solutions to these optimization problems constitute Sadd.
All these methods propose to generate adversarial samples
across the decision boundary of the substitute model so that
each round of black-box attack can accurately correct the
model’s parameters to make it more similar to the target oracle.
B. Active Learning Strategy
The above framework first trains a substitute DNN, then
generates adversarial examples from the substitute DNN. How-
ever, it needs to query the oracle too many times, which is
not allowed in real applications. So, we propose to use active
learning to reduce the number of queries. The new procedure
is summarized in Algorithm 2.
In Step 10, Sadd can be crafted by any method mentioned
above. The major difference is that in Step 11, we use active
learning strategy to select the most informative samples in
the Sadd. The motivation of introducing active learning is
that different samples contribute differently to the learning
process, i.e., if we add samples that can be classified by the
current model with high confidence to the training set, then the
decision boundary changes little. So, we use active learning
strategy to select samples that help determine the decision
boundary. This paper applies Random Select, Max Entropy
and Margin based methods.
• Random Select method (RS): We randomly select k
samples out of the initial set as the new Sadd, where
k is the number of queries in each iteration.
• Max Entropy method (ME): We calculate H(x) =
−∑y∈Y F (x) logF (x) for each instance x in Sρ, then
we select k samples with largest entropy as Sadd.
Algorithm 2 Substitute DNN training using active learning
strategy
INPUT: target oracle O˜, a maximum number ρmax of training
epochs, and an initial training set S0.
OUTPUT: a trained substitute model F .
1: Define architecture F ;
2: for ρ = 0; ρ < ρmax; ρ++ do
3: if ρ = 0 then
4: D ← {(x, O˜(x))|x ∈ Sρ};
5: else
6: Dadd ← {(x, O˜(x))|x ∈ Sadd};
7: D ← [D,Dadd];
8: end if
9: train F with D;
10: craft Sadd;
11: Use Active Learning strategy to generate a new Sadd;
12: Sρ+1 ← Sρ ∪ Sadd;
13: end for
• Margin based method (MB): For each instance x in Sadd,
we denote the first and the second highest values of F (x)
by h1 and h2, and then set Disx = h1 − h2. We take k
samples with smallest Disx as Sadd.
Random Select method is considered as the baseline
method. Max Entropy method uses information entropy as a
measure of the amount of information contained in a sample.
From a geometric point of view, this method gives priority to
samples near the boundary, e.g., the confidence of samples far
from the decision boundary is so high that we do not need
to query the target oracle for their labels. Meanwhile, Margin
based method achieves a similar benefit. Disx indicates the
confidence of the substitute DNN about the unlabeled instance.
The lower confidence it shows, the harder this instance seems
to the current model.
Although active learning strategy can select a small set of
informative samples, it may introduce bias into the training
set. For example, all the selected samples may concentrate in
a small region of the input space. To address this limitation,
we propose to increase the diversity of samples in each round
of active learning. In this way, we are able to select samples
that are informative and evenly distributed. We represent the
diversity of a sample x by the distance between x and Sρ,
i.e., minx′∈Sρ ‖x−x′‖. We can integrate this criterion with all
the active learning strategies above by considering the ranking
of the instance selected by active learning methods and the
ranking of the diversity simultaneously.
Among the active learning methods mentioned above, Ran-
dom Select method treats all the samples in Sadd as equal, so
the ranking of each sample is the same. On the other hand,
Max Entropy method and Margin based method calculate a
score for each sample which implies a ranking. We combine
the ranking of active learning strategies with that of the
diversity to select a sample set for querying:
• RS + diversity: rank each instance x in Sadd according to
minx′∈Sρ ‖x− x′‖, and select the top k largest samples.
• ME + diversity: rank each instance x according to
{
R
(
−∑
y∈Y F (x) logF (x)
)
+R
(
minx′∈Sρ ‖x− x′‖
)}
, and
select the top k smallest samples.
• MB + diversity: rank each instance x according to{
r
(
Disx
)
+ R
(
minx′∈Sρ ‖x − x′‖
)}
, and select the
top k smallest samples.
Here, we use R to denote the ranking sorted from large to
small, and r to denote the ranking sorted from small to large.
IV. EXPERIMENT
In this section, we first compare the performance of different
data augmentation methods within the passive learning frame-
work. Then, we validate the performance of our algorithm
which considers active learning and diversity of the query set
simultaneously.
A. Setup
We evaluate the performance of our algorithm on three
datasets, i.e., MNIST [35], Fashion-MNIST [36] and CIFAR-
10 [37]. We random select 100 samples as the initial training
set (with 10 samples from each class) for each dataset. We
assume adversaries can collect such a limited sample set from
the oracle task.
The metric we used to evaluate the attack pattern is divided
into two parts: Accuracy of the target oracle (Acc) and
Similarity (Simi). Acc is an indicator of the success rate of
attacks (the lower, the better). We use FGSM to generate
adversarial examples over the substitute model and denote the
accuracy of oracle when tested with these adversarial examples
as Acc. Simi represents the similarity between our substitute
model and the oracle (the higher, the better). We query the
oracle with the entire dataset and treat the result as a new
dataset. We denote the accuracy of the substitute model when
tested with this dataset by Simi.
For dataset MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, we use a pre-
trained CNN model with accuracy 99.24% as the target oracle
and a simple CNN model which contains a convolutional layer
of 32 convolution kernels, a max-pooling layer, and a fully-
connected layer as the substitute network. The structure of the
target oracle is invisible to our algorithm. The parameters of
white-box attack methods are set according to the suggestion
in their original papers. The parameter λ of FGSM attack
which aims to generate query samples is set to be 0.2. The
parameters  and α of Iterative Gradient Sign are set to be
0.2 and 10. The λ of Fast Gradient Value is set to be 0.2.
The iteration of C&W is set as 100 and the learning rate
is set as 0.005. The goal of these parameters is to constrain
the adversarial samples not far from the original samples. For
dataset CIFAR-10, we use a pre-trained Resnet [38] model
whose accuracy is more than 91% as the target oracle and
train a substitute VGG-19 [39] network to attack the oracle.
The parameters of the white-box attack methods are set to be
the same as that used in MNIST.
B. Passive Learning Framework
We construct the samples with different white-box attack
methods and compare the performance of the substitute models
trained thereby. In black-box attack, the number of queries is
the main cost. The more we query, the more likely to cause
the target oracle’s attention. The experimental results on the
MNIST dataset are shown in Table 1, from which we observe
that when using C&W or Deepfool method to craft query
samples, the iteration we need for an effective attack is less
than FGSM and other methods. We can also verify that with
the same number of queries, the substitute model trained by
data generated with C&W or Deepfool method has a higher
attack success rate and a higher similarity with the oracle.
Results on the Fashion-MNIST dataset are consistent, and
due to the similarity between MNIST and Fashion-MNIST,
we only report partial results in Table 2. We also present a
full result over CIFAR-10 in Table 3. As shown in Table 3,
the performance of C&W and Deepfool is better than the rest
of the attack methods.
The reason for the better performance of C&W and Deep-
fool is that these methods solve an optimization problem to
craft samples which can cross the boundary of the current
model. In contrast, other methods like FGSM construct sam-
ples from the original samples along the direction of the
gradient towards the decision boundary but may not cross
the boundary. This confirms our thought that there is more
information about the boundary within the samples crafted
by solving optimization problems than samples crafted by
gradient based attack methods.
C. Active Learning Strategy
Since C&W and Deepfool show a better performance than
other methods in previous experiments, we combine these two
methods with different active learning strategies in this part.
Fig. 2 shows the performance of the active learning method,
as well as our improved version that takes the diversity of
samples into consideration, where the parameter k is set to be
10. The Raw algorithm in Fig. 2 follows the setting in [13]
which doubles the number of queries in the first few iterations
each time, and then uses reservoir sampling method [40] which
is a Random Selection strategy in the later few iterations to
make the number of queries grow linearly.
As we can see in Fig. 2(a), the Acc of each active learning
method is lower than that of the Raw algorithm except RS
method. The reason is that the Raw algorithm queries more
samples than the RS methods in the first few iterations. How-
ever, as the number of iterations increases, the effects of Raw
algorithm and RS method become comparable. Furthermore,
in all cases, Acc of our improved version is lower than that of
the original active learning method. For example, to achieve
10% Acc, the original Max Entropy algorithm queries over
1600 times, our improved version only queries 600 times,
while the Raw algorithm queries more than 10000 times. The
curves on Simi in Fig. 2(b) also validate our motivation that
the diversity of sample set can effectively identify different
parts of the decision boundary. We observe that Simi increases
FGSM IGS FGV Deepfool C&W JSMA
itr query Acc Simi Acc Simi Acc Simi Acc Simi Acc Simi Acc Simi
0 100 0.4528 0.4521 0.4417 0.4764 0.4577 0.4253 0.4259 0.4009 0.4533 0.4197 0.4532 0.4107
1 200 0.3401 0.5628 0.2895 0.5684 0.3483 0.5853 0.3257 0.4894 0.3792 0.3577 0.2974 0.6173
2 400 0.2085 0.7521 0.2642 0.7648 0.2412 0.7451 0.2161 0.7415 0.2373 0.7504 0.2384 0.7936
3 800 0.2201 0.7706 0.2061 0.7684 0.1989 0.7701 0.1753 0.7679 0.2156 0.7564 0.1936 0.8362
4 1600 0.2253 0.7865 0.2427 0.7962 0.1783 0.8136 0.1242 0.8628 0.1688 0.8328 0.1873 0.8635
5 3200 0.1439 0.8330 0.1426 0.8286 0.1209 0.8460 0.0832 0.8969 0.1196 0.8572 0.1639 0.8935
6 6400 0.1289 0.8623 0.1317 0.8530 0.1374 0.8595 0.0801 0.8739 0.0693 0.9166 0.1373 0.9126
7 12800 0.0906 0.8682 0.0810 0.8778 0.1326 0.8877 0.0639 0.9283 0.0617 0.9310 0.1299 0.9263
8 25600 0.0652 0.8821 0.0656 0.8940 0.0752 0.9053 0.0625 0.9419 0.0563 0.9217 0.1108 0.9183
TABLE I: Results of using FGSM, Iterative Gradient Sign (IGS), JSMA, Fast Gradient Value (FGV), Deepfool and C&W to
craft samples for querying on MNIST. The evaluation metrics are Acc and Simi. The results on this table are averaged over
10 runs.
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Fig. 2: Black-box attack by combining C&W and active learning strategy on MNIST (ME: Max Entropy method, MB: Margin
based method, RS: Random Select method, diversity: our proposed active learning strategy). The curves on this Fig are averaged
over 10 runs.
# of Iterations 0 3 9
FGSM 0.5173 0.3746 0.2362
IGS 0.4762 0.3349 0.2169
FGV 0.5238 0.3676 0.2681
Deepfool 0.5017 0.3574 0.2031
C&W 0.5362 0.2717 0.1939
JSMA 0.4846 0.2907 0.2301
TABLE II: Results on the Fashion-MNIST dataset. The eval-
uation metric is Acc. The results on this table are averaged
over 10 runs.
much more quickly when we take diversity into consideration.
For example, to achieve 85% Simi, the original Max Entropy
algorithm queries over 600 times, while the improved version
only needs 200 times. This situation suggests that, the distor-
tions in the decision boundary of our substitute models are
more similar to that of oracle and considering the diversity of
query set can help modify the decision boundary better than
only using active learning algorithm. Due to the similarity
between MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, we omit the curves of
Fashion-MNIST in this paper.
We also tested our algorithm on CIFAR-10 and presented
the results of the active learning method, as well as our
improved version that takes the diversity of samples into
consideration. The Acc of our improved version is lower than
that of the original active learning method. For example, to
FGSM IGS FGV Deepfool C&W JSMA
itr query Acc Simi Acc Simi Acc Simi Acc Simi Acc Simi Acc Simi
0 100 0.5641 0.4712 0.5361 0.5351 0.4714 0.4736 0.4533 0.5361 0.5713 0.4613 0.4893 0.5136
1 200 0.5315 0.4616 0.5215 0.5271 0.4461 0.4361 0.4174 0.5713 0.5135 0.4719 0.4616 0.5574
2 400 0.4712 0.5135 0.4612 0.5713 0.4533 0.6345 0.3671 0.6471 0.5105 0.5531 0.4941 0.6184
3 800 0.4513 0.7174 0.4471 0.5582 0.4168 0.6643 0.3577 0.7473 0.4723 0.6341 0.4536 0.7145
4 1600 0.4462 0.7436 0.4463 0.6364 0.3757 0.6851 0.3416 0.7747 0.4613 0.6234 0.4531 0.7747
5 3200 0.4164 0.7481 0.4136 0.7485 0.3983 0.7275 0.3174 0.7431 0.4123 0.6572 0.4212 0.7557
6 6400 0.3963 0.7764 0.3857 0.7796 0.3557 0.7758 0.2747 0.7512 0.3681 0.7156 0.3873 0.7683
7 12800 0.3713 0.8361 0.3641 0.7979 0.3164 0.7843 0.2685 0.7736 0.3512 0.7351 0.3791 0.7791
8 25600 0.3413 0.8412 0.3813 0.7837 0.3264 0.7951 0.2579 0.7971 0.3377 0.7257 0.3681 0.7975
TABLE III: Results of using FGSM, Iterative Gradient Sign (IGS), JSMA, Fast Gradient Value (FGV), Deepfool and C&W
to craft samples for querying on CIFAR-10. The evaluation metrics are Acc and Simi. The results on this table are averaged
over 5 runs.
200 400 600 800 1000 12000
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Number of queries
Ac
c
 
 
C&W with Raw
C&W with ME
C&W with ME + diversity
200 400 600 800 1000 12000
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Number of queries
Ac
c
 
 
C&W with Raw
C&W with MB
C&W with MB + diversity
200 400 600 800 1000 12000
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Number of queries
Ac
c
 
 
C&W with Raw
C&W with RS
C&W with RS + diversity
(a) Acc vs. Number of queries
200 400 600 800 1000 12000.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Number of queries
Si
m
i
 
 
C&W with Raw
C&W with ME
C&W with ME + diversity
200 400 600 800 1000 12000.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Number of queries
Si
m
i
 
 
C&W with Raw
C&W with MB
C&W with MB + diversity
200 400 600 800 1000 12000.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Number of queries
Si
m
i
 
 
C&W with Raw
C&W with RS
C&W with RS + diversity
(b) Simi vs. Number of queries
Fig. 3: Black-box attack by combining C&W and active learning strategy on CIFAR-10 (ME: Max Entropy method, MB:
Margin based method, RS: Random Select method, diversity: our proposed active learning strategy). The curves on this Fig
are averaged over 5 runs.
achieve 10% Acc, the original Max Entropy algorithm queries
over 5000 times, our improved version only queries 400 times,
while the Raw algorithm queries more than 25600 times.
In summary, while the original active learning algorithm
(Max Entropy method and Margin based method) can be used
to reduce the number of queries significantly, our improved
version can further boost the performance.
In Fig. 4, we change the method from C&W to Deepfool
(Deepfool achieve as good performance as C&W in the exper-
iments of the previous passive learning framework) and report
the performance of our improved algorithm which considers
active learning strategy and diversity simultaneously. Again,
the results show that the combination of active learning and
the diversity of samples indeed reduces the number of queries
in transfer-based black-box attack significantly. For example,
when the number of queries reaches up to 400, the Acc of
Max Entropy algorithm is 10% lower than that of the Raw
algorithm, and the Simi is 20% higher.
In Fig. 5, We also tested our algorithm on CIFAR-10. We
use Deepfool to generate training data for the substitute model.
The Max Entropy strategy shows the best performance. The
accuracy of the target oracle against adversarial examples is
lower than 10% and the number of queries which the original
algorithm need is more than 10000, while our active learning
strategy can reduce to less than 1000.
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Fig. 4: Black-box attack by combining Deepfool and active learning strategy on MNIST (ME: Max Entropy method, MB:
Margin based method, RS: Random Select method, diversity: our proposed active learning strategy). The curves on this Fig
are averaged over 10 runs.
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Fig. 5: Black-box attack by combining Deepfool and active learning strategy on CIFAR-10 (ME: Max Entropy method, MB:
Margin based method, RS: Random Select method, diversity: our proposed active learning strategy). The curves on this Fig
are averaged over 5 runs.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have tested a number of white-box attack
methods and found that C&W attack and Deepfool yield the
overall best performance. In addition, we introduced active
learning to address the query-efficiency issue occurred in
transfer-based attack. To alleviate the bias caused by active
learning, we propose to maximize the diversity of query set
and our empirical study verifies its effectiveness. In the future,
we will apply our method to a variety of machine learning
models, rather than neural networks and apply more advanced
active learning strategy.
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